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1. Introduction  
 
This paper aims at analyzing the efficiency of European and U.S. commercial banks over 
the period 1995-98. We employ here a broad definition of efficiency, which covers scale 
and scope economies, as well as cost efficiency. 
The importance of such a work is in the provision of evidence as to whether significant 
variations in efficiency emerged after the consolidation process occurred within the United 
States during the 80s, and if some gains could be derived by the restructuring process in the 
European banking industries. 
Regarding the European banking industry many factors have contributed to increase 
competition among financial institutions in the last few years. The first important factor is 
deregulation, promoted by the Second European Directive on Banking and Financial 
Services, which leads banks to compete not only in the domestic markets but potentially all 
over the world. Second, European Monetary Union affects the level of competition in the 
banking sector of countries adopting the Euro. Moreover, technological advances and 
deregulation have favored a process of despecialization, allowing banks to lend at any 
maturity, and reducing the differences among sectors. 
Banks reacted to the increased European competition with an intense process of 
restructuring and growth leading the banking sector to experience an unprecedented level 
of consolidation through mergers and acquisitions operations among large financial 
institutions, very similar to that which occurred in the U.S. banking industry in the 1980s.  
The consolidation process aims at reaping profitability, reducing cost inefficiency, 
increasing market power, and exploiting scale and scope economies.  
So far, the empirical literature concerned with the U.S. experience (Berger et al., 1993; 
Clark, 1996; Clark and Speaker, 1994; Evanoff and Israilevich, 1991; Gilbert, 1984; 
Humphrey, 1990; Mester, 1987; Mitchell and Onvural, 1996) shows that overall the 
average cost curve is relatively flat with some evidence of scale efficiency gains for small 
banks. Results on scope economies are even more controversial since the literature 
provides little consensus on the existence and the extent of product mix efficiency (Berger 
and Humphrey, 1991 and 1994). The lesson would be that the only way to lower cost in 
banking is to improve the X-efficiency rather than focus on cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions (Allen and Rai, 1996). 
The much smaller number of cost studies on output banking efficiency for Europe shows 
that the average cost curve tends to be U-shaped and, to a lesser extent, scope economies 
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also exist. The European banking industry is interesting not only for its differences with the 
U.S. experience but also for the implications of financial markets integration policies. 
Empirical papers on the European experience have mainly focused on cost functions using 
data from a single bank or a single country (Altunbas et al., 1997; Athanassopoulos, 1998; 
Berg et al., 1993; Drake and Howcroft, 1994; Drake and Simper, 2002; Glass and 
McKillop, 1992; Parisio, 1992; Simper, 1999; Zardkoohi and Kolaris, 1994). 
Cross-countries analysis of efficiency and scale and scope economies in Europe refer to a 
pre-integration period (e.g. Altunbas and Molyneux, 1996; Vander-Vennet, 1996). Only a 
few studies provide, to our knowledge, comparison to recent data to analyze the effects of 
the opening up of the banking domestic markets (Cavallo and Rossi, 2001; Vander-Vennet, 
2002). 
The main innovations of our paper are: 
a) Providing panel data evidence over the period 1995-98 on output and X-
inefficiency for both European and U.S. commercial banks. This enables a 
comparison across different banking models employing recent data for 
commercial banks in 15 European countries and the United States. Specifically, 
we have a first block of 338 commercial banks belonging to the fifteen 
European countries run as a whole by using country fixed effects and a second 
one built up with a sample of 279 U.S. commercial banks. Given the differences 
in the factors market we make comparisons between them by building up 
specific models for the U.S. and European banking system. 
b) We depart from the empirical literature on this topic by representing the 
production function using three different cost function specifications: a) the 
widely used translog functional form; b) the relatively under-used flexible 
Fourier functional form (Gallant, 1981); and c) the Box-Cox cost function 
specification. A comparison of scale and scope economies scores deriving from 
these different specifications allows us to identify any mis-specification arising 
from the translog form and the robustness of the evidence provided. 
c) Our results for the U.S are in line with the evidence provided by the previous 
literature with some evidence in favor of slight scale economies. Results on 
scope economies are more controversial regarding the existence and the extent 
of product mix efficiency. The evidence for the European countries shows that 
overall the average cost curve is relatively flat with some evidence of scale 
efficiency gains for small banks. More puzzling are the results on the presence 
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of scope economies, which to some extent could be motivated by the 
consolidation and restructuring process in the banking industry. 
  
2. Methodology and data  
2.1 Definition of a bank cost function  
 
The concept of efficiency has been widely analyzed in the literature (Fried et al., 1993; Coelli, et al., 
1998).  A production function is efficient, in the Pareto and Hoopmans sense, when it represents the 
maximum output attainable from each input level, or the minimum level of each input leaving the 
output unchanged. As is well known from the theory of duality (Diewert, 1974; Shephard, 1953 and 
1970) under given conditions (exogenous prices and optimal behavior of the producer) the cost 
function is dual to the production function and gives an alternative and equivalent description of the 
technology of the producing unit (Jorgenson, 1986).  
In modeling the cost function of multiproduct firms such as banks, we deal with the problem of 
defining the appropriate specification. Despite the large body of literature on banks efficiency there 
is no general consensus on how to define inputs and outputs of multi-product financial firms. The 
two main issues are related to the role of deposits and whether inputs and outputs should be 
measured in physical or monetary units. The following five are the most used approaches in 
literature. 
 The production approach, being more concerned with the technical efficiency of financial 
institutions, defines the bank activity as production of services. Deposits are counted as output and 
interests paid on deposits are not included in bank total costs (Ferrier and Lovell, 1990). According 
to this approach input and output are measured in physical quantity (number of accounts, 
transactions processed, etc.). 
 The intermediation approach views banks as institutions that collect and allocate funds in 
loans and other assets; deposits are included among the inputs and interests in the total costs. 
 The asset approach is a variant of the intermediation approach where liabilities are 
considered as inputs and assets as output. 
 The value added approach identifies any balance sheet item as output if it absorbs a relevant 
share of capital and labor, otherwise it is considered as an input or non relevant output; according to 
this approach deposits are considered as an output since they imply the creation of value added. 
 Finally the user cost approach assumes that it is the net contribution to the bank revenue 
that defines inputs and outputs; in this case deposits are counted as outputs. 
The choice of a particular approach and consequently the definition used for the inputs and outputs 
are likely to affect the results of the efficiency estimates (Favero and Papi, 1995; Hunter and 
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Timme, 1995; Resti, 1997). The researcher’s choice is often a pragmatic compromise between 
theoretical considerations and data availability. 
 
2.2 Description of the variables and data 
 
In modeling the cost functions of European and U.S. commercial banks we employ here two 
different approaches. In the case of European commercial banks we employ the modified 
production approach1 as in Berger and Humphrey (1991) and Bauer et al. (1993). Under this 
approach, the interests paid on deposits are counted as input, while the volume of deposits is 
considered to be an output, on the assumption that it is able to approximate the amount of services 
provided to customers.  Following this approach, we shape the cost function for European banks  
using three outputs: deposits, loans and services, all expressed as dollar amounts. The deposits 
variable comprises all funds raised from retail. The loans variable includes all forms of performing 
and non-performing loans to customers. The services variable is constructed as the total value of 
services income2. 
The price of labor, capital and deposits are the three input variables considered in the cost function. 
The total costs associated with these inputs are, respectively: total personnel expenses, non-staff 
expenses and the total interest on deposits. The labor price is calculated as total personnel cost 
divided by the number of employees. The capital price is obtained by dividing the cost of capital 
(operative cost associated with capital expenses) by fixed assets net of depreciation3.  
Finally, the deposit price is computed by dividing the total interest expenses by the total amount of 
deposits. Total costs are obtained as the sum of operating costs and interest expenses. 
Differently from some previous studies (Hunter et al., 1990; Mitchell and Onvural, 1996), in setting 
the cost function for U.S. banks we employ the value added approach. Deposits, loans and services 
are counted as outputs, labor and capital are inputs.  
The choice of adopting a slightly different cost function specification for U.S. banks has been 
driven by the fact that so far the cost of depositing for U.S. banks has been quite negligible 
compared to European banks. This analysis has also been supported by the evidence obtained on 
                                                 
1 Since the specification used may affect the efficiency results, we also test an alternative specification based on the 
value added approach. The Hausman test shows that the specification we adopted in this analysis is more appropriate to 
better fit the data.  
2 It comprises fee-based income, net revenues from security and currency trading. 
3 In order to adjust the book value of fixed capital to account for distortions - due to the fact that fixed capital may have 
been recorded in different periods, and revalued because of tax laws or mergers - we use an adjusted value computed as 
the fitted value of a fixed effects panel estimation (overall R2 = 83%) in logarithms, where, the book value fixed asset is 
regressed on a constant term (9.34; t= 7.7), the size (deposit and loans to customers) (0.008; t=13) and the number of 
employees (21.31; t=7.63)3 (coefficients and t-statistics in parenthesis). Obviously the use of branches instead of the 
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tests performed on the different alternative specifications of the cost function: the value added 
approach seems to better fit our data from U.S. commercial banks4. 
We focus on the period 1995-98 to analyze the effect of the deregulation and the increased 
competition in the European banking industry. Moreover, as pointed out by Vander-Vennet (2002), 
during these years all the European countries faced a positive business cycle period and were trying 
to match the Maastrich convergence criteria. Finally, also the U.S. economy experienced a positive 
business cycle with high growth pace over the period 1995-98.    
We use two separate balanced panels: one, consisting of 1352 observations, refers to a sample of 
banks belonging to the 15 members of the European Union, and the second refers to a sample of 
U.S. banks and consists of 1116 observations. All the data come from balance sheet and profit and 
loss accounts provided by Bankscope (BVD-IBCA Ldt) an international database, which provides 
data on financial institutions. Data are expressed in monetary values in U.S. dollars at 1995 prices 
and are adjusted for the PPP.  
Although our analysis is based on data only from large commercial banks we test for robustness of 
results over the sample. To do this we divide our data-set into three sub-groups - large, medium and 
small - by selecting for each country, banks belonging to the highest, the middle and the lowest 
decile of the asset size distribution resulting from the balance sheet. 
 
 
3. Estimation methodology 
 
The first step of our analysis consists in modeling the bank cost function. We will then calculate the 
X-efficiency scores using the distributional free approach, and finally the scale and scope 
economies. 
A few recent studies on banking efficiency concentrate on the comparison between profit and cost 
efficiency (e.g. Berger and Mester, 1997; Vander-Vennet, 2002). A distinction between these two 
problems arises when markets are not perfect. In this paper we employ the cost function approach 
assuming that the European Union integration and the more competitive environment introduced by 
the II European Directive for the Banking industry bring markets closer to perfect competition. A 
competitive market can also be assumed for the U.S. banking industry.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
number of employees would have been more appropriate (see also Resti, 1997) in the fit of fixed capital. However in 
our data base the number of branches is not available. 
4 Preliminary estimates give a non significant t statistic for the deposit price, and its omission does not alter the result. 
Moreover the Hausman test supports the specification we adopt.  
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3.1 Cost function specifications 
 
In modeling the cost function we use three different functional forms: (i) the translog cost function 
(TL), (ii) the Box-Cox specification and (iii) the Fourier Flexible form (FF). The choice of using 
different specifications is particularly felt here in order to derive robust conclusions when dealing 
with comparisons between countries. 
(i) As is known, the TL is one of the most widely used functional form in the empirical 
literature on bank efficiency. It presents the well-known advantages of being a flexible form - in the 
sense that it imposes few restrictions on the underlying cost structure and hence (by duality theory) 
on the production technology - and of including, as a particular case, the Cobb-Douglas 
specification. Furthermore, since the TL is the most used form in modeling the cost function of 
financial institutions, our findings can easily be compared with previous studies. 
Following this specification the s-th firm total cost can be written as follows: 
 
lnTC s = α0 +Σi βi lnyi + Σ k γk lnpk  + (½)Σi βi i (lnyi)2 +Σi Σj βi ji<j lnyi lnyj + (½)Σk γ kk (lnpk)2 + Σk Σl 
γk l k< l lnp k lnpl +Σ k Σ i  ϕk i k < i lnp k lnyi             (1)  
i, j = 1, 2 , 3;  
k, l = 1, 2, 3 for Europe; 
k, l = 1, 2 for the U.S. 
where TC is the total cost, yi is the i-th output and pk is the price of the k-th input. 
 
The cost function has been estimated imposing the linear homogeneity conditions and cost 
exhaustion, obtained by normalizing total cost (TC), the price of labor and the price of deposits by 
the price of capital5. Moreover, we impose the symmetry conditions (βij = βji  ∀   i, j  and γkl = γlk  ∀   k, 
l) and the linear homogeneity restrictions6.  
;1
3
1
=∑
=k
kγ 0
3
1
=∑
=k
klγ ,  for all l;           0
3
1
=∑
=k
kiϕ ,      for all i.        
In order to improve the quality of the TL approximation, the logs of outputs and prices are all 
expressed as differences from the sample mean (lnyis – ln[1/nΣns=1 yis], logpks – ln[1/nΣns=1 pks], 
where n is the sample size),  as in Resti, 1997.   
                                                 
5 The traditional share equations, are the alternative way to estimate the cost function, where the parameters of the TL 
derive from the simultaneous estimation of the cost function and the input-share equations obtained from the Shepard’s 
Lemma (Shephard, 1970) and partially differentiating the TL function with respect to each factor price pk. In our study 
we drop the share equations. This also avoids the problems discussed in Bauer (1990) and Cebenoyan et al. (1993) 
which arise from using share equations to measure X-inefficiency . 
6 A likelihood-ratio test shows that the restrictions on the parameters fit well with the data.  
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Although the TL is the most used functional form in banking efficiency studies, it presents two 
main pitfalls: (a) the estimated values of product specific scale economies and scope economies are 
often unreliable, since they require the calculation of the cost function at zero output level7. (b) As 
pointed out in White (1980) and Mitchell and Onvural (1996) the TL estimates do not necessarily 
correspond to the second order Taylor approximation of the underlying function at an expansion 
point.  
In order to deal with the first problem we use the generalized translog function, better known as 
Box-Cox specification, while to address the second argument we use the Fourier Flexible (FF) 
function.  
ii) The usefulness of Box-Cox in this setting is twofold as it allows for the possibility to 
consider zero values as arguments of the function, and secondly it represents an alternative 
instrument to test the robustness of our results. Following Caves et al. (1980), and Fuss and 
Waverman (1981) we adopt the following Box-Cox specification8.  
 
lnTC s = α0 + Σi βi (yλ i – 1)/λ + Σk γk lnpk + (½)Σi βii   [(yλ i – 1)/λ]2 +Σi Σj βi ji<j (yλ i – 1) 
(yλ j – 1)/λ 2 + (½)Σk βkk (lnpk)2 + Σk Σl γk l k< l lnpk lnpl + Σk Σi ϕki k < i lnpk (yλ i – 1)/λ;   
          (2) 
lim (yλ i – 1)/λ = lnyiλ→0  
where λ is the Box-Cox filter (parameter) whose positive value confers on this specification the 
proprieties of the translog as λ tends to zero9.  
As far as the applicability of the Box-Cox is concerned, the literature has pointed to the lack of 
coherence with the theory for the non-homogeneity in input prices as demonstrated in Shaffer 
(1994). Despite the correctness of the remark10 and the solution found through the modified Box-
Cox function, the problem is posed in wrong terms since the crucial point is the arbitrariness of the 
                                                 
7 Empirical literature addresses the problem by using a positive number instead that zero output, such as 10% of the 
mean outputs (e.g. Kim, 1986). 
8 See Christensen et al. (1973) and Brown et al. (1979) for the multi-product version. Lau (1974) introduced the squared 
specification as a second order approximation. 
9 Spitzer (1982) and Zarembka (1987) consider an estimation with this transformation also for the dependent variable.  
10 Considering for simplicity, only the transformed terms: 
∑
≠
−+=
1
1'
01
1)/(
)/ln(
j j
j
j
jpp
pC λθθ
λ
  
where:    10
'
0 θθθ += is the usual Box-Cox function normalised by an input price, and the following expression 
∑
≠
−=
1
1
11
1)/(
)/ln(
j j
j
j
jpp
ppC λθ
λ
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approximation made by means of any quadratic forms. However, also neglecting the latter aspect 
one can easily skip the problem of the homogeneity in prices, by recurring to a functional form in 
which the transformation applies only to outputs terms. Outputs (expressed in logs), in fact, are 
difficult to be addressed when dealing with scale and scope efficiency. Then the price 
homogeneity may be imposed on the coefficients following the Cobb-Douglas hypothesis.  
The Box-Cox specification does not mitigate the mentioned critique about the use of a second order 
approximation that opens the way to the third approach based on the more complete and 
sophisticated Fourier flexible form.  
(iii) The FF, combines the standard TL, nested in the FF, with the non-parametric Fourier 
form i.e. the trigonometric terms. As pointed out by Berger and De Young (1997) because the FF 
includes trigonometric transformations of the variables, it can globally approximate the underlying 
cost function over the entire range of data. This theoretical improvement has been proved to give a 
better fit of the data than the TL (McAllister and McManus, 1993; and Mitchell and Onvural, 1996,  
Berger and  Mester, 1997). 
 
FF: 
lnTC s = α0 +Σi βi lnyi + Σk γk lnpk  + (½)Σi βii (lnyi)2 +Σi Σj βiji<j lnyi lnyj + (½)Σk γ kk 
(lnpk)2 + Σk Σl γkl k< l lnp k lnpl +Σ k Σ i  ϕk i k < i lnp k lnyi +  
Σi ai cos(y i) + Σi bi sin(y i) + Σk ck cos(pk) + Σk dk sin(pk) + 
Σij eij [cos(yi) + cos(yj)] + Σij fij [sin(yi) + sin(yj)] + Σij gij [cos(yi) - cos(yj)] +  
Σij hij [sin(yi) - sin(yj)] + Σkl ikl [cos(pk) + cos(pl)] +  
Σkl lkl [sin(pk) + sin(pl)] + Σkl mkl [cos(pk) - cos(pl)] + Σkl nkl [sin(pk) - sin(pl)] 
            (3) 
In the FF specification the trigonometric addends have been truncated coherently with our sample 
size11. It is also possible to check that the way of building such a trigonometric part is analogous to 
the logarithmic one except for the terms whose combined effect is evaluated by means of additions 
and subtractions instead of multiplication as in the TL. 
The trigonometric part represents the non-parametric size of the function that confers it with the 
nice propriety to correctly infer on the coefficients of the underlying true cost function. In other 
                                                                                                                                                                  
is the modified Box-Cox. In both cases the sum of the elasticities is constrained by the form adopted to 0 and 1 
respectively (demonstration available upon request). Note that there is no way to switch from the first function to the 
other one by fixing opportune values for p0 = 0 and λ0 =- p1, as the resulting parameter θ0’ = θ0 + θ0/ p1 is not constant.  
11 The truncation point has been chosen according to the rule of thumb expounded in Eastwood and Gallant  (1991) that 
the number of parameters should be set equal to the number of the observation raised to the power of the two-thirds in 
order to obtain consistent and asymptotically normal estimates. However, as suggested in Gallant (1981), the effective 
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words the use of the FF confers a substantial gain to the analysis for the fact that it minimizes the 
distance from the true function in the Sobolev sense. This allows our analysis the possibility to 
work with asymptotically correct nominal sizes of the rejection region for statistical tests (Gallant, 
1982) and enables us to estimate the true function with an average prediction bias arbitrarily small 
as the number of terms in the Fourier expansion increases (Gallant, 1981). Such a fact attributes a 
sort of non parametric property to this flexible functional form, that is not present in the other two 
functions considered (TL and Box-Cox). Moreover, special care must be addressed to the choice of 
the rescaling form for the trigonometric terms in order to coherently fix their argument in the 0-2π 
range. The choice here has fallen on the simple criterion of the ratio to the sample mean as 
suggested in Mitchell and Onvural (1996) after having verified the pertinence with the mentioned 
interval. Given the local approximation set up of the Box-Cox and TL the corresponding results 
must be assessed with particular care for the possible bias in the indicators derived.  
It goes without saying that restrictions imposed on TL also hold for the other functional forms.  
 
3.2 The measurement of efficiency 
Following Berger (1993) we employ here the distribution-free model for computing the cost 
efficiency levels12. The advantage of this model is that it avoids the strong distributional 
assumptions of stochastic frontier13. According to this approach the distribution free inefficiency is 
based on the distance between the estimated cost function and the s-th effective bank cost in the 
sample (s=1,.....,N), assuming that over time the random part of the error term is negligible with 
only the error term caused by inefficiency remaining. Hence a straightforward measure of 
inefficiency can be denoted as: 
inefficiency = exp(min(lnus)-lnus))         (4) 
 
where us is the residual vector after having averaged over time and min(lnus) is the least inefficient 
bank in the sample. 
 
3.3 Scale and scope economies 
 
In order to measure how changes in bank output affect cost we use the three estimated cost 
equations to construct indicators of scale and scope economies. We use the well-known measures: 
                                                                                                                                                                  
number of the coefficients is corrected by reducing the number of the regressors to cope with the possible 
multicollinearity. 
12 For discussion on this approach see Allen and Rai (1996), Ashton  (1998),  Baltagi (1995), De Young (1997), Drake 
and Weyman-Jones (1996).   
13 See Aigner et. al. (1977), Bauer (1990), Berger (1993), Battese and Coelli (1995).   
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(i) the ray-scale economies; (ii) the specific scale economies; (iii) scope economies; (iv) specific 
scope economies. 
(i) For a multiproduct firm, ray scale economies (RSCE) are measured by the inverse of the 
elasticity (ηTC/y) of cost with respect to output taken along a ray that holds output mix constant 
(Baumol et al., 1982): 
RSCE= 1/(ηTC/y) = ( )
1
ln/ln
−


 ∂∑
i
iyTC           (5) 
For the normalized translog cost function specified as above the economies of scale are expressed 
as:   
1
lnln
−







 ++= ∑ ∑ ∑
i j
k
k
ikjiji pyRSCE ϕββ       (6) 
At the point of approximation, where yi = pi =1 this expression reduces to: ( ) 1−∑i iβ . 
Production presents increasing, constant or decreasing returns to scale depending on the RSCE to 
be respectively greater, equal or less than the unity. 
(ii) In the multiproduct case, it is also possible to calculate the product specific scale economies 
(SLi), which measures the difference in cost incurred by the firm when producing the given level of 
output i as opposed to producing a zero level, holding the other outputs fixed (Kim, 1986). 
SLi are defined as (Baumol et al., 1982): 
 
yTC
i
ii
i
i
TCIC
yTCy
TCICSL
/
//
η=∂∂=          (7) 
where ICi is the incremental cost of the i-th product defined as TC - TC(yi=0, pk) where the 
subtrahend is the total cost excluded the i-th output. 
The estimation of product specific economies of scale requires the calculation of the cost function at 
zero output levels. As suggested by Kim (1986) the empirical problems in the application of these 
measures when dealing with logs can be solved using a reference point, such as 10% of the sample 
mean outputs. Following this approach, Kim (1986) derives the following expression for product 
specific returns to scale at the approximation point:  
 
SLi = [exp{α0} - exp{α0 – βi (lnε)+ βii/2 (lnε)2}]/βi exp{α0}                                                       (8) 
where ε = 0.1 is used in place of zero output. 
 
(iii) Economies of scope exist when the total costs of a firm producing more than one output are 
lower than the sum of the costs of producing each output separately. 
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In the case of a firm producing three outputs, the degree of economies of scope is:  
 
Scope = [(∑iTCi(yi, pk) - TC)/TC] = 
[Σiexp{– (lnε) Σj ≠ i βj + 1/2 (lnε)2 Σj ≠ i Σ v ≠ i β jv} - exp{α0}]/exp{α0}                          (9) 
i, j, v = 1, 2, 3  
where TCi(yi ,pk)  is the cost of producing yi on a stand-alone.  
A value of this indicator greater/smaller than zero indicates respectively the presence of economies/ 
diseconomies of scope. 
(iv) Product specific scope economies (Pscopei) arise when the costs of the joint production of the i-
th output with the existing combination of the other outputs is lower than the cost of producing that 
output separately. At the point of approximation Pscopei is given by: 
 
Pscopei = [(TCi(yi, pk) + TC(yi=0, pk) - TC)/TC] =  
[exp{– βilnε + βii/2 (lnε)2} + exp{– lnε Σj ≠ i βj + (1/2 (lnε)2) Σj ≠ i Σv ≠ i βjv}- exp{α0}]/exp{α0} 
             (10) 
i, j, v = 1, 2, 3 
As regards the indicators relative to the Box-Cox functional form, they are derived from the 
specifications (2). 
(i) Scale economies: 
RSCE= 1/Σi βi           (11) 
 
(ii) Specific scale economies: 
 SLi= [exp{α0} - exp{α0 – βi/λ + βii/2 λ2}]/βi exp{α0}        (12) 
  
(iii) Scope economies: 
 
Scope = [Σiexp{– (1/λ) Σj ≠ i βj + (1/2 λ2) Σ j ≠ i Σ v ≠ i β j v} - exp{α0}]/ exp{α0} 
i, j, v = 1, 2,  3                       (13) 
 
(iv) Specific scope economies: 
 
Pscopei = exp{– βi/λ + βii/2 λ2} + exp{– (1/λ) Σj ≠ i βj + (1/2 λ2) Σj ≠ i Σv ≠ i βjv}- exp{α0}]/exp{α0} 
 i, j, v = 1, 2,  3                   (14) 
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Given the length of the presentation for the FF scale and scope indicators we refer to  Appendix A. 
In the case of FF scale and scope analysis only the out of the mean sample indicators are reported, 
in view of the robustness of the FF on the entire range of data (Gallant, 1981).  
 
4. Empirical findings 
 
In our empirical analysis we present the evidence from the TL, FF and Box-Cox cost function 
specifications both for European and for U.S. commercial banks. 
In the case of European banks we run a common frontier. This analysis, on the one hand, allows to 
compare performances of banks across countries. On the other hand, it does not allow to determine 
whether divergence in inefficiency is due to differences in the technology used or to environmental 
conditions14. We face the latter criticism using only one type of financial institution: the commercial 
banks. For these banks the assumption of employing the same technology could be supported by 
considering that commercial banks provide all over Europe the same financial services and 
activities. Moreover, we employ dummies for each of the 15 European countries in order to capture 
differences across countries.  
 
4.1 Cost functions estimations  
 
In this section we present both the results of the cost functions estimations for European and U.S. 
commercial banks. 
In Table 1 we show the evidence from the FF, TL and Box-Cox specifications for European banks. 
Overall the results obtained are consistent over the different specifications used. 
As regards the TL estimations we can point out the following results.  
[insert Table 1] 
1) It is noteworthy that all the outputs and input price coefficients present the expected 
positive sign and are significant.   
2) The elasticities of production costs to unit staff (γp1=0.324) and to deposit price 
(γp2=0.297) are smaller than the elasticity to the capital price (0.379= 1-γp1-γp2) for the linear 
homogeneity conditions imposed on the TL cost function. This means that banks can control more 
personnel and deposit expenses than capital expenses when prices rise. A plausible explanation is 
that, at least in the short run, it seems more difficult to cut capital expenses, especially in the field of 
                                                 
14 To account for these effects, Dietsch and Lozano Vivas (2000) impose a cross-equation equality restriction on the 
parameters of each country’s cost frontier in order to obtain results which are not influenced by the country’s 
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information technology, less so far labor costs. Similar evidence has been found by Resti (1997) for 
a sample of Italian banks and is quite consistent with the ongoing tendency in Europe of 
restructuring.   
The elasticity to deposit price shows the importance of interest on deposits in the European market. 
Moreover, the positive and significant deposits price coefficient supports the choice of considering 
such price as an input. 
3) Among outputs, deposits (βy1= 0.568) are more cost absorbing than loans and services. 
This result at a first look could appear surprising if one considers that the lending activity is 
expected to be more cost absorbing than the deposit management, because of high costs connected 
with the monitoring and collection of non performing loans. However, as pointed out also by Resti 
(1997), who found the same evidence on a sample of Italian banks, deposits may imply a larger 
network of branches which in turn increases operating costs. 
As we expected, services are the least cost absorbing output (βy3= 0.065) since they are less 
dependent on the firm’s physical capital. Moreover, they have not been the most important source 
of income for banks in Europe. The sharp reduction of the bank’s main profit source (interest 
income), which has occurred in the last few years, is forcing banks to find new income alternatives 
to deal in. In this respect, services may become one of the non-interest income sources, thus 
implying a larger impact on the cost function. 
As far as the FF and Box-Cox are concerned we find some small differences when compared with 
TL estimates. The result that deposits are the most cost absorbing output is largely confirmed (0.587 
for FF and 0.934 for Box-Cox). Moreover there is also clear evidence on services (0.183 for FF and 
0.178 for Box-Cox) which result to be the least cost absorbing output with respect to loans (0.205 
for FF and 0.372 for Box-Cox) and deposits. 
The coefficients for deposits and loans are largely overvalued with the Box-Cox specification when 
compared with the TL and the FF specifications. The FF and the Box-Cox provide almost the same 
elasticity for services, which is significantly higher than that obtained with the TL. 
Considering the input prices, both the FF and the Box-Cox estimates produce lower elasticity 
coefficients for capital price (0.248 for FF and 0.19 for the Box-Cox). 
Finally, the common evidence across the three cost function specifications is that deposits are the 
most cost absorbing output and services the least cost absorbing one; among the input prices, capital 
shows the highest elasticity.  
                                                                                                                                                                  
technology. They add country-specific environmental variables to the cost function specification to measure the impact 
of those variables on the differences among country inefficiencies. 
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This evidence describes European commercial banks as characterized by high cost elasticity to 
deposits which pay high interest rates and increase operative costs associated with the network of 
branches.  
4) As far as the countries effect is concerned the UK, Denmark and Ireland lay on the 
European average15. We find that the FF specification supports fixed effects better than the other 
two functional forms.  
Table 2 presents the evidence for the U.S. commercial banks obtained from the three different 
functional form estimates. As pointed out above (par. 2.2), in the case of U.S. commercial banks we 
model the cost functions following the value added approach. The choice of adopting a different 
cost function - in which we do not include the price of deposits among the inputs - is supported by 
the test on the specification, and by the fact that the cost of deposits for U.S. banks is quite 
negligible. 
[insert Table 2] 
In the case of U.S. commercial banks the evidence provided by our analysis seems quite consistent 
across the different specifications employed: coefficients present almost the same values, and are 
strongly significant. Only the Box-Cox estimates for loans and services tend to be slightly 
overvalued compared to the TL and FF figures. Overall, the evidence suggests considering results 
reliable.  
As expected the outcome underlines a large difference between European and U.S. commercial 
banks. 
As opposed to the European case, in all specifications the most cost absorbing output is services, 
with the elasticity for deposits and loans always lower.  
The level and the quality of services provided to customers, more than deposits, have been an 
important source of income for U.S. commercial banks. Therefore it seems plausible to expect 
higher cost connected to the production of this item, which requires high investment in financial 
system technology (software, telecommunication, etc.) and human capital.  
Looking at the input prices, surprisingly and contrarily to what one might expect, given also the 
flexibility of the labor market, the elasticity of production cost to unit staff is much higher than the 
elasticity to capital price. Such a result has also been confirmed by the other two functional forms. 
This evidence would imply that firms can control more easily capital, cutting down its demand, 
rather than labor, when prices rise.    
The puzzling evidence has to be addressed with caution since we are considering a period of 
exceptional growth for the U.S. economy (driven also by the new economy and information 
                                                 
15 For these countries the dummies are not significantly different from zero. 
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technology). High profit expectations and growing demand for factors, which characterized the 
period, may make constraints less binding16. This is also consistent with the high level of 
inefficiency obtained from our analysis.  
Finally, the analysis for Europe and the U.S. shows that the three functional forms employed 
performed quite well producing in most cases consistent evidence. However, tests performed on the 
nested TL versus FF functional forms show, tenuous evidence in favor of FF for Europe and a 
stronger one for the U.S.17.This empirical outcome finds support in White (1980), Gallant (1981) 
and Mitchell and Onvural (1996) which show the superiority of the FF with the respect to TL 
estimations. 
  
4.2 Distribution free cost efficiency results. 
 
The distribution free cost inefficiency estimates, in Table 3, point out a significant level of 
inefficiency both for European and U.S. commercials banks. This evidence is consistent with the 
analysis in Bauer (1990), Allen and Rai (1996), Cavallo and Rossi (2001) and Vander-Vennet 
(2002), which also find significant level of inefficiency in the banking industry. Moreover, our 
results are strengthened by the inefficiency scorers we obtained by using the stochastic frontier 
approach18.  
While Box-Cox tends to overestimate the efficiency scores, both TL and FF cost functions show 
similar outcomes (see Table 3).  
[insert Table 3] 
For Europe, we find an average inefficiency level of 32 per cent with the TL, 36 per cent with the 
FF, and 20 per cent with the Box-Cox specification. While the magnitude of inefficiency dispersion 
between TL (reporting a deviation of 0.11 with a minimum of 15 per cent inefficiency) and the FF 
(standard deviation of 0.093 and a minimum value of 17 per cent) is quite similar, the distribution 
of Box-Cox cost inefficiency shows lower inefficiency levels (20 per cent) with a standard 
deviation of 0.091 and a minimum of  6 per cent. 
                                                 
16 This evidence may be also supported by the fact that under fixed term contracts, which are the standard in the flexible 
structure of the U.S. labour market, workers in financial institutions benefit from large compensation payments if fired. 
17 We reject the Ho hypothesis on the base of the Ramsey-Reset test according to which model has no omitted variables 
at a level of confidence of 5%: Pvalue = 0.010 for Europe, Pvalue = 0.12, for the U.S. 
18 Berger and Mester (1997) also find that the efficiency level with the stochastic and the free distribution approach are 
similar. Our stochastic frontier estimates, obtained by Frontier 4.1 (Coelli, 96), are available upon request. 
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The analysis by bank dimension shows that for both European and U.S. commercial banks there is 
not a consistent size effect, as also found by Vander-Vennet (2002) for a sample of European banks.  
This evidence shows that our findings are robust over the size samples used19.  
In particular, while FF presents almost the same score across sizes, TL and Box-Cox estimates 
show that efficiency tends to slightly decrease as the bank size increases. The cost inefficiency 
results for U.S. commercial banks suggest that the Box-Cox specification, as in the European case, 
overestimates the efficiency scores.  
 
4.3 Scale and scope economies findings 
 
In this section we present the evidence on scale and scope economies indicators obtained from the 
different cost functions for European and U.S. commercial banks. The aim here is to provide new 
evidence on bank output efficiency by using different functional forms (TL, FF and Box-Cox), and 
to check the robustness of the results over the specifications employed.  
The estimations are computed both out of the mean sample and at the mean sample. Obviously the 
former analysis allows us to infer on the indicators obtained. 
The evidence computed out of the mean sample for European Commercial banks (Table 4) can be 
summarized as follows. 
[insert Table 4] 
(i) Constant scale economies (RSCE), product specific diseconomies of scale (SLi), 
diseconomies of scope (Scope) and specific scope (Pscopei) diseconomies are detected in 
our study20.  
(ii) Since the results provided seem to be sensitive to the different functional forms employed, 
output efficiency scores should be interpreted with caution. Box-Cox provides evidence in 
favor of increasing returns to scale with the exception of large banks. On the contrary, TL 
scale economies are roughly constant both overall and at size level as in the FF case.  
(iii) Bank size classification - small, medium and large - does not significantly affect scale and 
scope economies indicators in the TL and FF. Almost all the scale indicators - both global 
and specific - obtained with these two specifications exhibit a quite stable pattern through 
the different bank sizes with a slight tendency for loans to increase as the dimension of a 
bank becomes larger. On the contrary, the Box-Cox scale economies indicators appear to be 
                                                 
19 As mentioned in par. 2.2, in our analysis we consider data only from large commercial banks. We split the sample in 
three classes according to the asset size distribution. Consequently, for small banks we mean the smallest in our sample. 
20 While some of our results are consistent with Vander-Vennet (2002), different evidence has been provided in Cavallo 
and Rossi (2001) over a wider tipology of financial institutions for the period 1992-97 in six European countries. 
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sensitive to the bank size, suggesting that the returns to scale are more pronounced for small 
banks. Looking at the Box-Cox product specific scale indicators the production of deposits 
seems to generate smaller diseconomies of scale as the size of the bank increases. 
(iv) Product specific diseconomies of scales are detected in all the specifications, with the 
exception of deposits and loans in the TL specification.  
(v) Diseconomies of scope are obtained by all functional forms. The presence of negative scope 
economies - lower than one in absolute values - indicates that the joint production of the 
three outputs - deposits, loans and services - is inefficient. Looking at the evidence from the 
three specifications, in the case of scope indicators the most significant results are those 
obtained with FF specification followed by the TL, which appear to fit the data poorly with 
respect to services scope economies. The Box-Cox specification seems to produce poorer 
scope indicators, although the sign, the magnitude and size effect, are consistent with the 
other two specifications. The evidence shows higher absolute values of scope diseconomies 
as the size of the firm decreases. This result may suggest that large size banks present less 
diseconomies of scope than small banks, suggesting that small financial institutions are less 
efficient in the joint multi output production.  
Due to the second order approximation of the TL and the Box-Cox, their fit, in the out of the 
mean sample data, may be poorer compared to the FF (Gallant, 1981). Therefore, TL and Box-Cox 
scale and scope indicators have also been computed at the mean sample (Table 5). 
[insert Table 5] 
While TL scale and scope estimates in the approximation point produce consistent evidence with 
previous analysis (out of the mean sample), the Box-Cox indicators seem to deviate from the out of 
the mean sample results: they undervalue the overall scale economies and slightly overvalue the 
scope indicators.  
As far as U.S. out of the mean sample indicators are concerned (Table 6), we can summarize the 
following evidence. 
[insert Table 6] 
(i) Results show the presence of overall scale economies, being more pronounced for 
small and medium banks. Large banks present slight diseconomies of scale (FF, Box-
Cox) and almost constant return to scale (TL). This evidence may suggest that a 
broader firm may incur higher physical capital and innovation costs, which do not 
suffice to exploit scale economies, given the U shaped average cost function.  
(ii) Product specific diseconomies of scale are detected by the analysis. Only in the case 
of the TL estimates we find evidence in favor of increasing specific scale economies 
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for loans and services. Therefore, at the product specific scale economies level, the 
most consistent evidence across the different specifications, is the presence of 
product specific  diseconomies of scale for deposits, which is significantly smaller 
than unity (with the exception for large banks which present product specific 
increasing economies of scale).  This evidence suggests that the production of 
deposits, due to the fact that it requires a wide network of branches, may cause a 
more than proportional rise in total costs21. 
 (iii) The tendency of product specific scale indicators to grow with bank size shows that 
U.S. large commercial banks, seem to be more efficient or less inefficient in the 
production of specific output than in the overall case.  
(iv) As far as the scope indicators are concerned, also for U.S. banks we find negative 
values of scope economies indicators over the different specifications.  
(v) Based on the Ramsey test, which shows that FF for U.S. banks approximates the true 
function better than the other functional forms, we tend to rely more upon the FF 
scale and scope indicators. Moreover, the indicators obtained from FF present always 
higher t values.  
As regards the indicators computed at the mean sample, the evidence almost confirms the 
results obtained by the out of the mean sample estimates: for TL, presence of overall constant 
returns to scale are detected, and increasing product scale economies are found for the three outputs 
(Table 7). 
[insert Table 7] 
For the Box-Cox estimates we obtain, consistently with previous analysis, specific 
diseconomies of scale and, differently from the out of the mean sample estimates, overall 
diseconomies of scale. Given the evidence on the overall scale economies, the Box-Cox 
approximation point estimates, tend to deviate more than the TL from the out of the mean sample 
analysis.   
Finally, the evidence from the out of and at the mean sample estimations support the view 
that both scale and scope economies, are larger in U.S. than in European banks. An acceptable 
reason for this is probably the higher level of technology included in the productive structure of 
U.S. banks, as shown in Hunter and Timme (1991), and the restructuring process occurred 
previously than in Europe. 
 
5. Conclusions 
                                                 
21 Note that this result does not contradict the low elasticity values for deposits, as specific economies of scale 
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The econometric analysis performed through the different specifications enables us to reach 
some conclusions regarding the cost structure of U.S. and European commercial banks. 
The use of the Fourier, translog and Box-Cox functions helped us in evaluating the robustness of 
our results through the several specifications proposed. Although the evidence on the cost function 
parameters presents some consistent values over the different functional forms, tests performed on 
the specifications are in favor of the Fourier which, turns up to better fit our data.  
Results for the two banking systems are coherent with the evidence that European commercial 
banks are traditionally more oriented to deposits and retails, while U.S. commercial banks are also 
focused on the services, given also the impact of the innovation in the field of information 
technology.  
Consistently we find for Europe that deposits are the most cost absorbing output, since they may 
require a broad network of branches which causes an increase in costs. On the contrary, services 
turn out to be the least cost absorbing output as they traditionally had never been the core bank 
activity in Europe. 
 For U.S. commercial banks services are found to be the most cost absorbing output, since they may 
involve high investments in information technology and human capital. 
As far as the input prices are concerned, European commercial banks turn out to control more 
personnel and deposits expenses than capital when prices rise. This evidence is quite consistent with 
the ongoing tendency in Europe to restructuring through mergers and acquisitions. The need for 
restructuring is also consistent with significant level of inefficiency detected by the cost efficiency 
estimates.  
Looking at the input prices for U.S. commercial banks, surprisingly and contrarily to what one 
might expect, production costs are more sensitive to unit staff than to capital price. This evidence 
would imply that firms can control more easily capital, cutting down its demand, rather than the 
demand for labor, when prices rise.    
The puzzling evidence has to be considered with caution since we are looking at a period (1995-
1998) of exceptional growth and low levels of unemployment for the U.S. economy. High profit 
expectations and the consequent growing demand for labor, which characterized the period, may 
make constraints less binding. This also turns out to be consistent with the high level of inefficiency 
obtained from our analysis.  
Looking at scale economies indicators, we find increasing global scale economies for the U.S. and  
less pronounced evidence for Europe. This may be due to the higher information technology 
                                                                                                                                                                  
indicators are based on the definition of incremental cost which is posed in discrete sense. 
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embedded in the production function of U.S. banks which obviously has an impact on the 
productivity of the system.  
The findings for scale economies in Europe, however have to be interpreted with caution, since 
indicators obtained seem to be sensitive to the different functional forms employed. Box-Cox 
provides evidence in favor of increasing return to scale economies with the exception of large 
banks. On the contrary, TL scale economies are roughly constant both overall and at size level as in 
the FF case.  
As far as the scope indicators are concerned we find evidence of diseconomies of scope, detected by 
all the functional forms, both in Europe and in the U.S. Such evidence, which is consistent with the 
significant level of inefficiency detected, is likely to be associated to the consolidation process for 
Europe and to the less binding constraints for U.S., given the positive expectations and the   high 
pace growth during the period considered. 
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Table 1. Cost functions estimates – European commercial banks  
Variables parameters FF TL Box-Cox 
lTC  Coef. z Coef.    z  Coef.    z 
ly1                      (deposits) βy1 0.587 13.190 0.568 11.260 bxy1 0.934 11.120
ly2                            (loans) βy2 0.205 5.92 0.258 6.390 bxy2 0.372 5.050
ly3                     (services) βy3 0.183 6.63 0.065 2.140 bxy3 0.178 4.460
lp1         (labor price) γ p1 0.248 20.120 0.324 23.510 lp1 0.190 11.66
lp2     (deposits price) γ p2 0.362 22.75 0.297 20.62 lp2 0.414 17.69
ly12 βy12 0.149 5.190 0.090 2.590 bxy12 0.041 0.330
ly22 βy22 0.023 2.420 0.047 4.99 bxy22 -0.050 -0.830
ly32 βy32 0.029 3.72 0.015 1.92 bxy32 -0.089 -1.980
lp12 γ p12 -0.061 -6.150 -0.055 -4.670 lp12 -0.164 -14.690
l p22 γp22 0.135 13.490 0.102 11.98 lp22 0.067 0.208
ly1y2 βy1y2 -0.045 -3.500 -0.021 -1.320 bxy1y2 -0.151 -1.980
ly1y3 βy1y3 -0.080 -6.450 -0.048 -3.670 bxy1y3 -0.080 -1.290
ly2y3 βy2y3 0.030 4.410 0.008 1.140 bxy2y3 0.101 2.520
lp1p2 γ p1 p2 -0.040 -4.810 -0.016 -1.750 lp1p2 0.025 2.060
ly1p1 ϕy1 p1 -0.042 -2.290 -0.054 -2.640 bxy1p1 0.047 0.087
ly2p1 ϕy2 p1 -0.004 -0.310 -0.005 -0.370 bxy2p1 -0.015 -0.630
ly3p1 ϕy3 p1 0.024 2.340 0.014 1.370 bxy3p1 0.018 1.260
ly1p2 ϕy1 p2 0.081 5.470 0.066 4.390 bxy1p2 0.087 2.320
ly2p2 ϕy2 p2 -0.041 -4.060 -0.028 -2.600 bxy2p2 -0.071 -2.290
ly3p2 ϕy3 p2 -0.046 -5.630 -0.036 -4.510 bxy3p2 -0.087 -3.890
sumcosy1y2 esumcosy1y2 0.031 0.106  
sumsiny1y2 fsumsiny1y2 0.019 1.200  
Difcosy1y3 gdifcosy1y3 -0.006 -0.200  
Difcosy2y3 gdifcosy2y3 0.007 0.270  
difsiny1y3 hdifsiny1y3 -0.029 -0.950  
difsiny2y3 hdifsiny2y3 0.018 0.042  
sumcosp1p2 isumcos p1p2 0.177 0.212  
sinp1p2 lsum sin p1p2 0.038 1.150  
Difcosp1p2 mdifcos p1p2 0.142 0.189  
difsinp1p2 ndifsin p1p2 0.015 0.520  
Austria D[Austria] -0.254 -2.590 -0.306 -1.530 D[Austria] -0.379 -2.480
Belgium D[Belgium] -0.320 -3.590 -0.432 -2.420 D[Belgium] -0.473 -3.410
Denmark D[Denmark] 0.061 0.067 -0.084 -0.450 D[Denmark] -0.085 -0.600
France D[France] -0.284 -3.590 -0.248 -1.570 D[France] -0.300 -2.430
Germany D[Germany] -0.403 -5.050 -0.456 -2.850 D[Germany] -0.436 -3.500
Greece D[Greece] 0.719 7.560 0.790 4.240 D[Greece] 0.765 5.170
Ireland D[Ireland] 0.071 0.074 -0.122 -0.660 D[Ireland] -0.067 -0.460
Italy D[Italy] 0.138 1.69 0.177 1.080 D[Italy]  -0.006 -0.050
Luxemburg D[Luxemburg] -0.288 -3.520 -0.258 -1.590 D[Luxemburg] -0.268 -2.100
Holland D[Holland] -0.300 -3.530 -0.262 -1.530 D[Holland] -0.204 -1.540
Portugal D[Portugal] 0.273 3.300 0.330 1.97 D[Portugal] 0.302 2.340
Spain D[Spain] 0.279 3.160 0.365 2.050 D[Spain] 0.214 1.560
Sweden D[Sweden] -0.297 -2.790 -0.663 -3.110 D[Sweden] -0.531 -3.140
UK D[UK] -0.033 -0.410 -0.001 -0.010 D[UK] -0.113 -0.900
Cons α0 14.59 133.90 15.01 94.58 α0 15.013 121.42
R2  0.9851 0.9762 R2 0.9670
Obs=1352     
A random-effects GLS regression is used in all specifications. The prefix l stands for logs; sum and dif 
represent respectively the sum and difference between trigonometric operators. The total cost, the price of labor (p1) and 
the price of deposits (p2) are normalized to the price of capital. Mixed products and squares of inputs and outputs 
represent the second order terms of the flexible form. 
 23
Table 2.  Cost functions estimates - United States commercial banks 
  FF TL BoxCox 
variables parameters     variables   
lTC  Coef. z Coef. z  Coef. z 
ly1            (deposits) βy1 0.268 6.360 0.289 8.050 bxy1 0.276 4.420
ly2                   (loans) βy2 0.248 5.430 0.238 5.970 bxy2 0.449 7.800
ly3             (services) βy3 0.425 14.76 0.417 15.290 bxy3 0.570 13.460
lp1  (labor price) γp1 0.797 36.59 0.828 40.420 lp1 0.820 27.650
ly12 βy12 0.025 1.520 0.024 1.530 bxy12 -0.348 -3.090
ly22 βy22 -0.004 -0.250 0.002 0.170 bxy22 -0.614 -5.040
ly32 βy32 0.050 3.440 0.037 2.570 bxy32 -0.140 -4.120
lp12 γp12 -0.037 -2.020 -0.031 -1.740 lp12 -0.064 -2.810
ly1y2 βy1y2 0.057 0.178 0.050 3.300 bxy1y2 0.490 4.510
ly1y3 βy1y3 -0.041 -2.080 -0.025 -1.300 bxy1y3 -0.047 -1.060
ly2y3 βy2y3 -0.043 -3.130 -0.047 -3.510 bxy2y3 -0.014 -0.330
ly1p1 ϕy1p1 0.036 0.108 0.044 2.370 bxy1p1 0.120 2.530
ly2p1 ϕy2 p1 -0.094 -5.610 -0.080 -4.790 bxy2p1 -0.206 -4.500
ly3p1 ϕy3 p1 0.002 0.090 -0.020 -1.110 bxy3p1 -0.001 -0.020
cosp1  ccos p1 0.016 0.068   
sinp1  dsin p1 -0.084 -4.780   
sumcosy1y2 esumcosy1y2 0.019 0.380   
sumcosy1y3 esumcosy1y3 -0.034 -0.690   
sumsiny1y2 fsumsiny1y2 -0.019 -0.780   
difcosy1y3 gdifcosy2y3 -0.090 -1.720   
difcosy1y2 gdifcosy2y2 0.125 0.126   
difsiny2y3 hdifsiny2y3 0.083 2.260   
cons α0 11.73 249.93 11.64 464.680 α0 11.56 300.410
R2  0.9752  0.9648  0.9612 
Obs=1116      
A random-effects GLS regression is used in all specifications. The prefixes l stands for logs; sum and dif represent 
respectively the sum and difference between trigonometric operators.  The total cost and the price of labor (p1) are 
normalized to the price of capital. 
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Table 3. Distribution free cost inefficiency estimates – European and U. S. commercial banks 
 FF TL BOX-COX 
EUROPE 
Total 
 
0.36 
(0.093) 
t= 3,87 
0.32 
(0.111) 
t= 2,90 
0.21 
(0.091) 
t= 2,33 
Small 0.36 
(0.0778) 
t= 5,0 
0.35 
(0.101) 
t= 3,5 
0.267 
(0.085) 
t= 3,21 
Medium 
 
0.36 
(0.111) 
t= 3,20 
0.31 
(0.112) 
t= 3,10 
0.17 
(0.087) 
t= 2,13 
Large 0.35 
(0.063) 
t= 5,83 
0.30 
(  0.112) 
t= 3,0 
0.21 
( 0.076) 
t= 3,0 
U.S. 
Total 0.38 
(0.141) 
t= 2,70 
0.37 
(0.136) 
t= 2,70 
0.17 
( 0.084) 
t= 2,12 
Small 0.37 
(0.129) 
t= 3,08 
0.35 
(0.123) 
t= 2,90 
0.19 
(  0.100) 
t= 1,90 
Medium  0.38 
(0.157) 
t= 2,53 
0.37 
(0.152) 
t= 2,46 
0.15 
( 0.072) 
t= 2,14 
Large 0.39 
(0.118) 
t= 3,54 
0.37 
( 0.112) 
t= 3,36 
0.18 
( 0.078) 
t= 2,67 
In parenthesis we report the standard deviation values. 
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Table 4. Scale and scope economies indicators from the Fourier, TL and Box-Cox  
 specifications for European commercial banks 
 FF TL Box-Cox 
 RSCE t RSCE t RSCE t 
Overall 1,00 9,87 1,08 11,45 1,34 2,52 
Small 1,00 22,47 1,11 12,34 2,14 10,61 
Medium 1,00 27,87 1,08 14,56 1,35 3,74 
Large 1,00 10,01 1,03 9,06 0,80 3,30 
    
 SL1  (deposits) t SL1  t SL1 t 
 0,69 4,7 1,49 6,61 0,39 1,10 
Small 0,64 4,79 1,57 8,26 0,09 2,48 
Medium 0,7 5,43 1,47 7,86 0,32 1,88 
Large 0,69 3,27 1,45 4,95 0,84 2,38 
    
 SL2  (loans) t SL2 t SL2 t 
 0,17 2,29 1,63 5,23 0,11 0,92 
Small 0,17 2,53 1,54 5,13 0,05 1,70 
Medium 0,16 2,45 1,72 5,76 0,10 1,60 
Large 0,19 1,67 1,92 13,97 0,19 1,31 
    
 SL3  (services) t SL3 t SL3 t 
 0,11 1,67 0,84 0,23 0,03 0,71 
Small 0,15 2,77 0,40 1,49 0,02 1,36 
Medium 0,1 1,9 0,72 1,24 0,03 0,99 
Large 0,07 0,98 1,32 1,67 0,08 0,71 
    
 Scope t Scope t Scope t 
 -0,87 -3,07 -0,88 -10,30 0,05 0,11 
Small -0,97 -79,01 -0,92 -61,88 0,49 3,15 
Medium -0,95 -30,17 -0,91 -21,45 -0,03 -0,10 
Large -0,64 -1,34 -0,80 -6,56 -0,26 -0,44 
    
 Pscope1  (deposits) t Pscope 1 t Pscope 1 t 
 -0,87 -2,82 -0,89 -8,65 -0,04 -0,12 
Small -0,99 -16,5 -0,95 -51,26 0,20 2,47 
Medium -0,96 -28,6 -0,92 -19,80 -0,12 -0,69 
Large -0,59 -1,18 -0,79 -5,64 -0,15 -0,23 
    
 Pscope2 (loans) t Pscope 2 t Pscope2 t 
 -0,94 -20,88 -0,89 -23,95 -0,17 -0,72 
Small -0,91 -40,47 -0,85 -40,91 0,09 1,07 
Medium -0,93 -21,12 -0,89 -45,33 -0,19 -1,21 
Large -0,97 -22,85 -0,94 -48,82 -0,40 -1,74 
    
 Pscope3  (services) t Pscope3 t Pscope3 t 
 -0,64 -2,49 -0,27 -0,54 -0,08 -0,31 
Small -0,79 -10,53 -0,59 -6,67 0,20 2,31 
Medium -0,7 -5,35 -0,42 -2,39 -0,07 -0,43 
Large -0,39 -1,12 -0,29 -0,43 -0,41 -2,46 
RSCE: ray scale economies; SL1 SL2 SL3: product specific return to scale. Production presents increasing, constant and 
decreasing return to scale depending on the scale indicators (RSCE, SL1 SL2 SL3) being greater equal and less than 
unity. Indicators are computed out of the mean sample. 
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Table 5.  Scale and scope economies indicators computed at the mean sample data 
  for European commercial banks 
 TL Box-Cox 
Mean RSCE 1,12 0,67 
Mean SL1                (deposits) 0,99 0,76 
Mean SL2                    (loans) 1,12 0,23 
Mean SL3                (services) 1,05 0,09 
Mean Scope -0,92 -0,61 
Mean Pscope1         (deposits) -0,92 -0,53 
Mean Pscope2             (loans) -0,87 -0,55 
Mean Pscope3         (services) -0,40 -0,47 
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Table 6. Scale and scope economies indicators from the Fourier, TL and Box-Cox  
 specifications for U.S. commercial banks 
 
USA FF                TL Box-Cox 
 RSCE t RSCE t RSCE t 
 1,2 5,6 1,13 18,19 1,55 2,44 
       
Small 1,2 18,5 1,15 21,40 2,30 6,24 
Medium 1,2 6,9 1,12 16,71 1,32 3,33 
Large 0,9 2,4 1,10 23,36 0,89 2,33 
       
 SL1  (deposits) t SL1 t SL1 t 
 0,3 2,2 0,92 1,71 0,26 0,66 
Small 0,2 4,2 0,23 1,37 0,07 2,99 
Medium 0,3 3,2 0,93 2,59 0,19 1,48 
Large 0,5 1,6 1,68 14,69 1,03 1,66 
       
 SL2 (loans) t SL2 t SL2 t 
 0,2 10,0 1,66 5,14 0,17 1,67 
Small 0,1 2,1 1,66 5,70 0,11 2,38 
Medium 0,1 1,4 1,63 3,81 0,21 1,85 
Large 0,5 1,5 1,94 80,06 0,32 1,17 
       
 SL3  (services) t SL3 t SL3 t 
 0,4 4,3 1,61 1,93 0,21 1,41 
Small 0,4 7,3 1,26 1,23 0,10 1,39 
Medium 0,4 4,5 1,50 1,89 0,27 1,81 
Large 0,4 1,6 2,45 6,36 0,38 2,33 
       
 Scope t Scope t Scope t 
 -0,9 -23,3 -0,95 -23,41 -0,77 -5,44 
Small -0,9 -16,9 -0,91 -20,00 -0,62 -9,65 
Medium -1,0 -58,5 -0,96 -48,31 -0,82 -9,05 
Large -1,0 -34,9 -0,97 -91,13 -0,97 -65,99 
       
 Pscope1  (deposits) t Pscope1 t Pscope1 t 
 -0,9 -5,6 -0,21 -0,72 -0,69 -4,08 
Small -0,8 -3,6 0,07 0,54 -0,52 -10,94 
Medium -0,9 -9,5 -0,25 -1,35 -0,71 -6,31 
Large -1,0 -54,2 -0,67 -5,26 -0,97 -24,36 
       
 Pscope2  (loans) t Pscope2 t Pscope2 t 
 -1,0 -44,0 -0,50 -2,98 -0,79 -6,36 
Small -1,0 -53,5 -0,38 -2,04 -0,66 -14,28 
Medium -1,0 -98,9 -0,56 -4,35 -0,82 -10,24 
Large -1,0 -27,7 -0,56 -5,39 -0,97 -24,21 
       
 Pscope3  (services) t Pscope3 t Pscope3 t 
 -1,0 -36,9 0,07 0,11 -0,56 -2,85 
Small -1,0 -149,4 0,69 1,19 -0,39 -4,69 
Medium -1,0 -104,9 -0,14 -0,35 -0,61 -4,43 
Large -0,9 -26,2 -0,54 -6,01 -0,78 -2,93 
RSCE: ray scale economies; SL1 SL2 SL3: product specific return to scale. Production presents increasing, constant and 
decreasing return to scale depending on the scale indicators (RSCE, SL1 SL2 SL3) being greater equal and less than 
unity. Indicators are computed out of the mean sample. 
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Table 7.  Scale and scope economies indicators computed at the mean sample data  
  for U.S. banks 
 TL Box-Cox 
Mean RSCE 1,05 0,77 
Mean SL1                (deposits) 1,43 0,24 
Mean SL 2                    (loans) 1,74 0,43 
Mean SL 3                (services) 1,28 0,46 
Mean Scope -0,98 -0,94 
Mean  Pscope1        (deposits) -0,88 -0,85 
Mean Pscope2             (loans) -0,88 -0,94 
Mean Pscope3         (services) -0,93 -0,78 
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 APPENDIX A 
 
Scale and scope economies indicators for the Fourier flexible functional form 
 
The calculations of the scale and scope economies indicators for FF are shown in this 
appendix. The indicators here are based on the European banks cost function from which 
the U.S. case can be easily derived.  
Symbols are the same as in the paper and they label the correspondent coefficients. η(yi) 
stands for the elasticity of the total cost with respect to the i-th output. 
 
Overall Scale economies: 
 
η(y1) =βy1+βy12*ly1+βy1y2*ly2+βy1y3*ly3+ϕy1p1 *lp1+ϕy1p2 *lp2  (A.1)        
+exp(ly1)*( esumcosy1y2*(-siny1) + fsumsiny1y2*cosy1+ gdifcosy1y3*(-siny1)+ 
hdifsiny1y3*cosy1); 
 
η(y2)  =βy2+βy22*ly2+βy1y2*ly1+βy2y3*ly3+ ϕy2 p1 *l p1+ϕy2 p2 *lp2  (A.2) 
+exp(ly2)*(esumcosy1y2*(-siny2)+ fsumsiny1y2*cosy2+ gdifcosy2y3*siny2 
+ hdifsiny2y3*(-cosy2)); 
 
η(y3)  =βy3 + βy32*ly3+βy1y3*ly1+βy2y3*ly2+ϕy3 p1*l p1+ϕy3 p2 *lp2  (A.3) 
+exp(ly3)*(gdifcosy1y3*siny3 + gdifcosy2y3*siny3+ hdifsiny1y3* 
(-cosy3)+ hdifsiny2y3*(-cosy3)); 
 
RSCE = 1/∑iη(yi) = 1/(βy1+βy2+βy3+βy12*ly1+βy1y2*(ly1+ly2)+  (A.4) 
βy1y3*(ly1+ly3)+ βy22*ly2 + βy2y3*(ly2+ly3)+ βy32*ly3 + 
ϕy1 p1 *lp1 +ϕy1p2 *lp2 +ϕy2 p1 *lp1+ 
ϕy2p2 *lp2+ϕy3 p1 *lp1 +ϕy3p2 *lp2  
+exp(ly1)* (esumcosy1y2*(-siny1)+ fsumsiny1y2*cos y1+ gdifcosy1y3*(-sin y1)+ 
hdifsiny1y3*cosy1) +exp(l y2)* (esumcosy1y2*(-sin y2)+ 
 fsumsiny1y2*cosy2+ gdifcosy2y3*siny2+ hdifsiny2y3*(-cosy2)) 
 +exp(ly3)* (gdifcosy1y3*siny3+ gdifcosy2y3*siny3+ 
hdifsiny1y3*(-cosy3)+ hdifsiny2y3*(-cosy3))); 
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Specific Scale Economies: 
 
TC = exp(α0+βy1*ly1+βy2*ly2+βy3*ly3+γ p1*l p1+    (A.5) 
γ p2*lp2+βy12*ly12+βy22*ly22+βy32*ly32+γ p12*lp12+γ p22* 
lp22+βy1y2*ly1ly2+βy1y3*ly1ly3 
+βy2y2*ly2ly3+γ p1 p2 *lp1lp2+ϕy1p1*ly1lp1 
+ϕy2p1*ly2lp1+ϕy3 p1*ly3lp1+ϕy1 p2*ly1lp2+ϕy2 p2*ly2lp2 + ϕy3 p2 * 
ly3lp2+ 
D[Austria]*Austria +D[Belgium]*Belgium +D[Denmark]*Denmark + 
D[France]*France+D[Germany]*Germany+D[Greece]*Greece 
+D[Ireland]*Ireland+D[Italy]*Italy+D[Luxembourg]*Luxembourg 
+D[Holland]*Holland+D[Portugal]*Portugal+D[Spain]*Spain+D[Sweden]*Sweden 
+D[UK]*UK 
+ fsumsiny1y2*sumsiny1y2+ esumcosy1y2*sumcosy1y2+ hdifsiny1y3*difsiny1y3 
+ hdifsiny2y3*difsiny2y3+ gdifcosy1y3*difcosy1y3+ gdifcosy2y3*difcosy2y3 
+ lsumsin p1 p2 *sumsinp1p2+ isumcos p1 p2 *sumcosp1p2+ ndifsin p1 p2 *difsinp1p2 
+ mdifcos p1 p2 *difcosp1p2); 
 
TC(y1=0,pk)=exp(α0+βy1*ln(ε)+βy2*ly2+βy3*ly3+γ p1*lp1+γ p2*lp2             (A.6)   
+βy12*(ln(ε))2+βy22*ly22+βy32*ly32+γ p12*lp12+γp22*lp22+βy1y2*ly2ln(ε) 
+βy1y3*ly3ln(ε)+βy2y2*ly2ly3 
+γ p1p2*lp1lp2+ϕy1p1*lp1*ln(ε)+ϕy2 p1*ly2lp1+ϕy3p1*ly3lp1+ϕy1p2*ln(ε)lp2+ϕy2p2*ly2lp2 
+ϕy3 p2 *ly3lp2+ 
D[Austria]*Austria +D[Belgium]*Belgium +D[Denmark]*Denmark + 
D[France]*France+D[Germany]*Germany+D[Greece]*Greece 
+D[Ireland]*Ireland+D[Italy]*Italy+D[Luxembourg]*Luxembourg 
+D[Holland]*Holland+D[Portugal]*Portugal+D[Spain]*Spain+D[Sweden]*Sweden 
+D[UK]*UK 
fsumsiny1y2*siny2+ esumcosy1y2*(1+cosy2)+ hdifsiny1y3*(- siny3)+ 
 hdifsiny2y3*difsiny2y3+ gdifcosy1y3*(1- cosy3)+ gdifcosy2y3*difcosy2y3 
+ lsumsin p1p2 *sumsinp1p2+ isumcos p1p2 *sumcosp1p2+ ndifsin p1p2 *difsinp1p2 
+ mdifcosp1p2 *difcosp1p2); 
 
SL1 = (TC - TC(y1=0, pk))/TC *(1/η(y1));     (A.7) 
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TC(y2=0, pk)  = exp(α0+βy1*ly1+βy2* ln(ε)+βy3*ly3+γp1*lp1+  (A.8) 
γ p2*lp2+βy12*ly12+βy22* ln(ε)2+βy32*ly32+γ p12*lp12+γp22* 
lp22+βy1y2*ly1*ln(ε)+βy1y3*ly1ly3 
+βy2y2* ln(ε)ly3+γ p1p2 *lp1lp2+ϕy1p1*ly1lp1+ϕy2p1* ln(ε)lp1 
+ϕy3p1*ly3lp1+ϕy1p2*ly1lp2+ϕy2p2* ln(ε)lp2 + ϕy3p2 * 
ly3lp2+ 
D[Austria]*Austria +D[Belgium]*Belgium +D[Denmark]*Denmark + 
D[France]*France+D[Germany]*Germany+D[Greece]*Greece 
+D[Ireland]*Ireland+D[Italy]*Italy+D[Luxembourg]*Luxembourg 
+D[Holland]*Holland+D[Portugal]*Portugal+D[Spain]*Spain+D[Sweden]*Sweden 
+D[UK]*UK 
+ fsumsiny1y2*siny1+ esumcosy1y2*(1+cosy1) + hdifsiny1y3*difsiny1y3 
+ hdifsiny2y3*(- siny3)+ gdifcosy1y3*difcosy1y3+ gdifcosy2y3*(1- cosy3) 
+ lsumsin p1p2 *sumsinp1p2+ isumcos p1p2 *sumcosp1p2+ ndifsin p1p2 *difsinp1p2 
+ mdifcos p1p2 *difcosp1p2); 
 
SL2 = (TC - TC(y2=0, pk))/TC *(1/η(y2));                 (A.9) 
 
TC(y3=0,pk) = exp(α0+βy1*ly1+βy2*ly2+βy3* ln(ε)+γp1*lp1+      (A.10) 
γp2*lp2+βy12*ly12+βy22*ly22+βy32*ln(ε)2+γ p12*lp12+γp22* 
lp22+βy1y2*ly1ly2+βy1y3*ly1ln(ε) 
+βy2y2*ly2ln(ε)+γp1p2 *lp1p2+ϕy1p1*ly1lp1 
+ϕy2p1*ly2lp1+ϕy3 p1* ln(ε)lp1+ϕy1p2*ly1lp2+ϕy2p2*ly2lp2 + ϕy3p2 * 
ln(ε)lp2+ 
D[Austria]*Austria +D[Belgium]*Belgium +D[Denmark]*Denmark + 
D[France]*France+D[Germany]*Germany+D[Greece]*Greece 
+D[Ireland]*Ireland+D[Italy]*Italy+D[Luxembourg]*Luxembourg 
+D[Holland]*Holland+D[Portugal]*Portugal+D[Spain]*Spain+D[Sweden]*Sweden 
+D[UK]*UK 
+ fsumsiny1y2*sumsiny1y2+ esumcosy1y2*sumcosy1y2+ hdifsiny1y3*siny1 
+hdifsiny2y3*siny2+gdifcosy1y3*(cosy1-1)+gdifcosy2y3*(cosy2-1)+lsumsin p1p2*sumsinp1p2 
+isumcos p1p2 *sumcosp1p2+ ndifsinp1p2 *difsin p1p2 
+ mdifcos p1p2 *difcosp1p2); 
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SL3 = (TC - TC(y3=0, pk))/TC *(1/η(y3));      (A.11) 
 
Scope economies: 
 
TC1(y1,pk) = exp(α0+βy1*ly1+βy2* ln(ε)+βy3* ln(ε)+γp1*lp1+   (A.12) 
γp2*lp2+βy12*ly12+βy22* ln(ε)2+βy32* ln(ε)2+γ p12*lp12+γp22* 
lp22+βy1y2*ly1ln(ε)+βy1y3*ly1ln(ε) 
+βy2y2* ln(ε)2+γ p1p2 *lp1p2+ϕy1 p1*ly1lp1 
+ϕy2 p1* ln(ε)lp1+ϕy3p1* ln(ε)lp1+ϕy1p2*ly1lp2+ϕy2p2* ln(ε)lp2 + ϕy3p2 * 
ln(ε)lp2+ 
D[Austria]*Austria +D[Belgium]*Belgium +D[Denmark]*Denmark + 
D[France]*France+D[Germany]*Germany+D[Greece]*Greece 
+D[Ireland]*Ireland+D[Italy]*Italy+D[Luxembourg]*Luxembourg 
+D[Holland]*Holland+D[Portugal]*Portugal+D[Spain]*Spain+D[Sweden]*Sweden 
+D[UK]*UK 
+ fsumsiny1y2*siny1+ esumcosy1y2*(cosy1+1)+ hdifsiny1y3*siny1 
+ gdifcosy1y3*(cosy1-1) + lsumsin p1p2 *sumsinp1p2+ isumcos p1p2 *sumcosp1p2+ 
ndifsin p1p2 *difsinp1p2+ mdifcos p1p2 *difcosp1p2); 
 
TC2(y2,pk) = exp(α0+βy1* ln(ε)+βy2*ly2+βy3* ln(ε)+γp1*lp1+   (A.13) 
γp2*lp2+βy12* ln(ε)2+βy22*ly22+βy32* ln(ε)2+γ p12*lp12+γp22* 
lp22+βy1y2* ln(ε)ly2+βy1y3* ln(ε)2 
+βy2y2*ly2ln(ε)+γp1p2 *lp1p2+ϕy1p1* ln(ε)lp1 
+ϕy2 p1*ly2lp1+ϕy3p1* ln(ε)lp1+ϕy1p2* ln(ε)lp2+ϕy2p2*ly2p2 + ϕy3p2 * 
ln(ε)lp2+ 
D[Austria]*Austria +D[Belgium]*Belgium +D[Denmark]*Denmark + 
D[France]*France+D[Germany]*Germany+D[Greece]*Greece 
+D[Ireland]*Ireland+D[Italy]*Italy+D[Luxembourg]*Luxembourg 
+D[Holland]*Holland+D[Portugal]*Portugal+D[Spain]*Spain+D[Sweden]*Sweden 
+D[UK]*UK 
+ fsumsiny1y2*(- siny2)+ esumcosy1y2*(cosy2+1) + hdifsiny2y3*siny2+ gdifcosy2y3*(cosy2-1) 
+ lsumsin p1p2 *sumsinp1p2+ isumcos p1p2 *sumcosp1p2+ ndifsin p1p2 *difsinp1p2 
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+ mdifcos p1p2 *difcosp1p2); 
 
TC3(y3,pk) = exp(α0+βy1* ln(ε)+βy2* ln(ε)+βy3*ly3+γ p1*lp1+   (A.14) 
γp2*lp2+βy12* ln(ε)2+βy22* ln(ε)2+βy32*ly32+γ p12*lp12+γp22* 
lp22+βy1y2* ln(ε)2+βy1y3* ln(ε)ly3 
+βy2y2* ln(ε)ly3+γ p1p2 *lp1p2+ϕy1p1* ln(ε)lp1 
+ϕy2 p1* ln(ε)lp1+ϕy3p1*ly3lp1+ϕy1p2* ln(ε)lp2+ϕy2p2* ln(ε)lp2 + ϕy3p2 * 
ly3lp2+ 
D[Austria]*Austria +D[Belgium]*Belgium +D[Denmark]*Denmark + 
D[France]*France+D[Germany]*Germany+D[Greece]*Greece 
+D[Ireland]*Ireland+D[Italy]*Italy+D[Luxembourg]*Luxembourg 
+D[Holland]*Holland+D[Portugal]*Portugal+D[Spain]*Spain+D[Sweden]*Sweden 
+D[UK]*UK 
+ esumcosy1y2*2+ hdifsiny1y3*(-siny3)+ 
 hdifsiny2y3*(-siny3)+ gdifcosy1y3*(1- cosy3)+ gdifcosy2y3*(1- cosy3) 
+ lsumsin p1p2 *sumsinp1 p2+ isumcos p1p2 *sumcosp1 p2+ ndifsin p1p2 *difsinp1p2 
+ mdifcos p1p2 *difcosp1p2); 
 
Pscope1 = (TC1(y1,pk) + TC(y1=0, pk) - TC)/TC;    (A.15) 
 
Pscope2 = (TC2(y2,pk) + TC(y2=0, pk) - TC)/TC;    (A.16)  
 
Pscope3 = (TC3(y3,pk) + TC(y3=0, pk) - TC)/TC;    (A.17) 
 
Overall Scope Economies: 
 
Scope = (∑iTCi(yi,pk) - TC)/TC;      (A.18) 
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Appendix B 
 
 
In the tables below we report the scale and scope economies indicators for banks in the 15 European 
countries.  
 
Table B.1. Scale and scope economies indicators from the FF specification. 
FFF Rsce z SL1 z SL2 z SL3 z Scope z Pscope1 z Pscope2 z Pscope3 z 
EUROPA 1,00 9,87 0,69 4,7 0,17 2,29 0,11 1,67 -0,87 -3,07 -0,87 -2,82 -0,94 -20,88 -0,64 -2,49 
Austria 1,02 29,45 0,7 12,93 0,14 4,21 0,09 2,04 -0,92 -15,85 -0,93 -14,45 -0,93 -28,82 -0,67 -4,8 
Belgium 1,00 20,14 0,74 5,07 0,14 3,02 0,09 1,47 -0,9 -7,03 -0,9 -6,43 -0,93 -28,64 -0,63 -2,97 
Denmark 1,03 14,14 0,63 6,32 0,16 3,4 0,14 2,64 -0,95 -29,25 -0,96 -22 -0,92 -8,24 -0,77 -7,4 
Finland 1,01 52,57 0,62 5,88 0,2 3,24 0,11 1,77 -0,94 -26,76 -0,94 -26,4 -0,96 -30,08 -0,69 -5,36 
France 0,99 15,64 0,69 5,12 0,18 2,6 0,11 1,82 -0,82 -1,87 -0,83 -1,87 -0,93 -19,22 -0,61 -1,79 
Germany 1,00 7,22 0,65 4,79 0,19 2,44 0,13 2,33 -0,88 -3,26 -0,88 -2,71 -0,94 -30,17 -0,7 -3,03 
Greek 1,03 40,01 0,61 4,26 0,19 2,63 0,13 1,47 -0,92 -10,02 -0,91 -8,97 -0,95 -39,71 -0,69 -3,39 
Ireland 0,97 18,68 0,7 6,52 0,17 3,68 0,12 2,47 -0,95 -51,58 -0,97 -39,72 -0,92 -27,7 -0,75 -10,91 
Italy 1,00 11,86 0,64 5,89 0,2 3,37 0,11 1,73 -0,84 -3,39 -0,84 -3,33 -0,96 -37,58 -0,64 -2,56 
Luxembourg 1,00 31,25 0,81 6,36 0,11 2,19 0,06 1,24 -0,93 -18,86 -0,94 -17,52 -0,92 -35,85 -0,57 -3,39 
Holland 1,30 10,68 0,71 4,07 0,16 1,86 0,1 1,74 -0,8 -1,86 -0,81 -1,85 -0,92 -10,45 -0,61 -1,92 
Portugal 1,03 28,85 0,68 5,69 0,16 2,77 0,09 1,46 -0,92 -12,74 -0,91 -11,41 -0,95 -30,44 -0,64 -4,1 
Spain 1,03 9,64 0,7 4,99 0,16 2,45 0,09 1,56 -0,66 -1,43 -0,66 -1,42 -0,96 -40,94 -0,44 -1,1 
Sweden 1,03 9,33 0,6 3 0,19 2,77 0,12 1,22 -0,84 -6,74 -0,78 -6,05 -0,96 -33,27 -0,67 -3,34 
UK 1,00 5,79 0,64 4,15 0,21 2,15 0,11 1,82 -0,92 -7,66 -0,88 -3,18 -0,95 -27,29 -0,69 -3,65 
Size                 
Small 1,00 22,47 0,64 4,79 0,17 2,53 0,15 2,77 -0,97 -79,01 -0,99 -16,5 -0,91 -40,47 -0,79 -10,53 
Medium 1,00 27,87 0,7 5,43 0,16 2,45 0,1 1,9 -0,95 -30,17 -0,96 -28,6 -0,93 -21,12 -0,7 -5,35 
Large 1,00 10,01 0,69 3,27 0,19 1,67 0,07 0,98 -0,64 -1,34 -0,59 -1,18 -0,97 -22,85 -0,39 -1,12 
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Table B.2. Scale and scope economies indicators from the TL specification. 
Translog Rsce z SL1 z SL2 z SL3 z Scope z Pscope1 z Pscope2 z Pscope3 z 
EUROPA 1,08 11,45 1,49 6,61 1,63 5,23 0,84 0,23 -0,88 -10,30 -0,89 -8,65 -0,89 -23,95 -0,27 -0,54 
Austria 1,08 12,65 1,46 11,52 1,90 38,54 0,82 0,22 -0,89 -23,64 -0,90 -19,59 -0,90 -28,75 -0,29 -0,99 
Belgium 1,12 8,53 1,51 4,55 1,81 11,05 1,16 1,56 -0,89 -16,38 -0,89 -11,83 -0,89 -24,80 -0,31 -0,86 
Denmark 1,12 9,70 1,65 5,29 1,72 9,17 0,62 1,12 -0,91 -29,98 -0,92 -20,27 -0,88 -26,61 -0,49 -2,54 
Finland 1,03 15,89 1,54 7,95 1,01 2,50 0,90 1,34 -0,91 -22,37 -0,92 -21,19 -0,91 -24,86 -0,34 -1,42 
France 1,07 11,48 1,47 8,27 1,60 4,79 0,65 1,04 -0,87 -7,29 -0,88 -7,01 -0,89 -24,84 -0,24 -0,37 
Germany 1,06 12,28 1,51 8,43 1,59 5,73 0,64 1,46 -0,90 -11,03 -0,91 -8,50 -0,88 -23,17 -0,36 -0,74 
Greek 1,10 22,04 1,58 7,56 1,73 7,55 0,83 0,90 -0,89 -12,42 -0,90 -12,00 -0,90 -31,21 -0,35 -0,92 
Ireland 1,02 20,84 1,48 8,95 1,59 5,78 0,82 0,23 -0,92 -46,35 -0,94 -34,53 -0,88 -21,71 -0,48 -3,06 
Italy 1,08 18,00 1,57 8,63 1,58 3,40 0,67 1,63 -0,87 -9,77 -0,88 -9,30 -0,91 -23,02 -0,17 -0,31 
Luxembourg 1,10 15,10 1,34 9,26 1,59 4,15 1,12 1,29 -0,88 -17,55 -0,89 -15,71 -0,88 -34,68 -0,30 -1,26 
Holland 1,04 15,58 1,44 6,77 1,65 6,72 0,78 2,06 -0,88 -9,39 -0,89 -8,95 -0,90 -23,41 -0,18 -0,26 
Portugal 1,08 16,38 1,51 5,88 1,73 6,48 0,69 1,07 -0,89 -17,99 -0,89 -17,80 -0,91 -37,98 -0,26 -0,88 
Spain 1,07 19,80 1,46 7,37 1,86 12,70 0,61 1,04 -0,81 -5,33 -0,81 -5,28 -0,92 -33,63 0,14 0,18 
Sweden 1,18 5,03 1,83 2,79 1,67 5,97 1,70 2,88 -0,86 -13,21 -0,82 -10,14 -0,94 -29,82 -0,15 -0,35 
UK 1,07 8,98 1,53 7,56 1,71 6,75 1,12 1,46 -0,91 -22,04 -0,91 -7,52 -0,90 -20,88 -0,34 -0,89 
Size                 
Small 1,11 12,34 1,57 8,26 1,54 5,13 0,40 1,49 -0,92 -61,88 -0,95 -51,26 -0,85 -40,91 -0,59 -6,67 
Medium 1,08 14,56 1,47 7,86 1,72 5,76 0,72 1,24 -0,91 -21,45 -0,92 -19,80 -0,89 -45,33 -0,42 -2,39 
Large 1,03 9,06 1,45 4,95 1,92 13,97 1,32 1,67 -0,80 -6,56 -0,79 -5,64 -0,94 -48,82 -0,29 -0,43 
 
Table B.3. Scale and scope economies indicators from the Box-Cox specification. 
BoxCox Rsce z SL1 z SL2 z SL3 z Scope z Pscope1 z Pscope2 z Pscope3 z 
EUROPA 1,34 2,52 0,39 1,10 0,11 0,92 0,03 0,71 0,05 0,11 -0,04 -0,12 -0,17 -0,72 -0,08 -0,31 
Austria 1,26 2,75 0,40 1,32 0,12 1,48 0,02 1,46 -0,03 -0,08 -0,13 -0,50 -0,22 -0,89 -0,08 -0,33 
Belgium 1,28 2,16 0,62 1,00 0,05 1,77 0,02 1,70 0,12 0,34 -0,01 -0,02 -0,10 -0,46 -0,07 -0,26 
Denmark 1,43 2,09 0,39 0,82 0,08 1,43 0,04 0,93 0,10 0,23 -0,05 -0,16 -0,13 -0,51 -0,03 -0,12 
Finland 0,92 1,95 0,47 2,06 0,24 1,25 0,09 0,77 -0,36 -0,81 -0,31 -1,19 -0,42 -1,50 -0,31 -1,02 
France 1,48 2,86 0,33 0,95 0,10 1,36 0,02 1,34 0,11 0,30 -0,01 -0,04 -0,13 -0,65 -0,01 -0,04 
Germany 1,53 2,98 0,28 0,87 0,13 0,65 0,03 1,10 0,15 0,36 0,04 0,09 -0,12 -0,53 -0,03 -0,12 
Greek 1,29 2,17 0,45 1,18 0,12 1,28 0,05 0,51 -0,09 -0,23 -0,15 -0,60 -0,23 -1,03 -0,14 -0,55 
Ireland 1,49 2,94 0,25 1,26 0,12 1,48 0,02 0,73 0,08 0,21 -0,05 -0,21 -0,15 -0,65 -0,01 -0,04 
Italy 1,18 2,54 0,44 1,46 0,12 1,40 0,04 1,25 0,02 0,04 0,01 0,02 -0,24 -0,99 -0,21 -0,79 
Luxembourg 1,37 2,76 0,41 1,38 0,05 1,41 0,01 1,10 0,13 0,37 -0,04 -0,16 -0,10 -0,49 0,03 0,18 
Holland 1,50 3,03 0,33 1,19 0,11 1,22 0,02 1,16 0,07 0,17 -0,02 -0,04 -0,16 -0,79 -0,06 -0,27 
Portugal 1,08 2,33 0,55 1,73 0,14 1,21 0,04 0,50 -0,23 -0,68 -0,25 -1,21 -0,32 -1,58 -0,21 -0,92 
Spain 1,03 2,85 0,67 1,76 0,13 1,26 0,04 0,86 -0,10 -0,16 -0,09 -0,16 -0,30 -1,48 -0,24 -1,43 
Sweden 0,81 2,19 0,89 1,71 0,21 0,91 0,12 1,42 -0,24 -0,39 -0,17 -0,30 -0,29 -0,65 -0,51 -1,78 
UK 1,27 2,38 0,30 1,31 0,15 1,00 0,05 0,97 -0,01 -0,01 -0,07 -0,19 -0,20 -0,71 -0,11 -0,36 
Size                 
Small 2,14 10,61 0,09 2,48 0,05 1,70 0,02 1,36 0,49 3,15 0,20 2,47 0,09 1,07 0,20 2,31 
Medium 1,35 3,74 0,32 1,88 0,10 1,60 0,03 0,99 -0,03 -0,10 -0,12 -0,69 -0,19 -1,21 -0,07 -0,43 
Large 0,80 3,30 0,84 2,38 0,19 1,31 0,08 0,71 -0,26 -0,44 -0,15 -0,23 -0,40 -1,74 -0,41 -2,46 
 
 
 
 
